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Abstract
This article explores the impact of EU membership on foreign direct investment (FDI). It analyses
empirically how the effects of such deep integration differ from other forms and investigates what
drives these effects. Using a structural gravity framework on annual bilateral FDI data for almost
every country in the world from 1985 to 2018, we find EU membership leads to about 60 per cent
higher FDI investment into the host economy from outside the EU, and around 50 per cent higher
intra‐EU FDI. Moreover, we find that the effect of EU membership on FDI is larger than from
membership of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the European Free Trade Association
and the Southern Common Market, and that the single market is the cornerstone of this differential
impact.
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Introduction
How much additional foreign direct investment (FDI) does a country receive because it
chooses to engage in deep vis‐à‐vis shallow forms of integration? This is a crucial ques-
tion within the European policy debate, for which, surprisingly, one still finds very few
answers. The main textbooks on the economics of European integration (Baldwin and
Wyplosz, 2006; De Grauwe, 2018; El‐Agraa, 2011) place limited emphasis on the impact
on inward FDI. Discussions about economic integration instead focus on the trade and
competition effects of membership in the EU (Mayes, 1978; Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2003, 2004), though the potential impact on FDI has also been recognized
(Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004).
Inward FDI plays an important role in the economic development of host economies
because, as a form of capital accumulation, FDI can generate growth while, if it is sourced
from technologically more advanced locations, it can lead to enhanced productivity, both
horizontally within industries (Haskel et al., 2007) and vertically up and down supply
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chains (Javorcik, 2004). Indeed, scholars have argued that the entry of foreign firms into a
host economy can stimulate technological innovation (Alfaro et al., 2004), put pressure
on domestic competitors (Mastromarco and Simar, 2015) and diffuse frontier manage-
ment practices (Bloom et al., 2012). FDI may also exhibit patterns of complementarity
not only with respect to trade, but also with other elements of financial globalization
(Greenaway and Kneller, 2007; Lane and Milesi‐Ferretti, 2008).
It is usually argued that EU membership increases FDI inflows, for example as a
consequence of higher customs duties on trade from outside the Union, shifting the
balance of advantage for external firms away from exporting and in favour of FDI
(Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2006). Such impacts have been widely documented, for instance,
by the increase in inward FDI following announcements about future EU membership on
FDI in transition economies in the 1990s (Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Bruno and
Cipollina, 2018; Crespo and Fontoura, 2007; Medve‐Bálint, 2013).
Such arguments have been strengthened by the formation of the European single
market, which represents a substantial deepening of the European integration programme
(Grin, 2003; Egan and Guimaraes, 2017). The origin of the single market is a 1985 White
Paper that identified, proposed and articulated an extensive set of about 300 measures.
The objective of these measures was to complete what was known at the time as the
common or internal market (Young, 2015). Although the 1957 Treaty of Rome created
a common market based on the free movement of goods, people, services and capital,
by the early 1980s, despite substantial progress with implementing the free movement
of goods, it was perceived that significantly more integration was needed to increase
the free movement of people, services as well as capital. The 1986 Single European
Act changed the decision‐making process in the European institutions (from unanimity
to a qualified majority) and established a deadline for completing the implementation of
the measures agreed upon (December 31, 1992).
Dunning (1997), Neary (2002) and Kalotay (2006), among others have considered
the potential impact of the singe market on FDI, but it has rarely been spelt out. In
addition to stimulating FDI by motivating production by firms from non EU members
to avoid tariffs placed on exports, the single market may stimulate additional FDI from
within and outside the EU. To understand this, we draw on Dunning’s (1993) categori-
zation of the motives for FDI into those that are market‐seeking, efficiency‐seeking,
resource‐seeking and strategic asset‐seeking. In recent years we have seen an increase
in FDI motivated by strategic asset‐seeking, as multinationals, especially from emerging
markets, seek to purchase brands and technologies in order to upgrade their own
capabilities. Because the EU is a region of high technological competence and sophisti-
cated brands, and is strengthened by the single market and EU innovation policies
(El‐Agraa, 2011), much of this FDI has come to the EU (Estrin et al., 2018). Examples
include the purchase by Tata of Jaguar Landrover; by Geely of Volvo and by Arcelik of
Grundig.
The single market has been a major driver of FDI since its formation. This is because it
created a unified market across Europe, so market‐seeking FDI from outside the EU
would be strongly attracted to the EU because of the size of the domestic market and
the possibilities of exploiting economies of scale and reducing transaction costs in the cre-
ation of overseas subsidiaries (Aristotelous and Fountas, 1996). As the EU is for the most
part not a region of low costs or natural resource munificence, market‐seeking motives are
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likely to be the predominant driver of external FDI (Kalotay, 2006). The single market is
also likely to increase FDI between member states, because of the significant differences
in costs among them, especially labour costs, combined with relatively short supply
chains and low transaction and coordination costs. Thus, efficiency‐seeking motives
probably predominated in intra‐EU FDI resulting from enlargement (Bevan and
Estrin, 2004), with, for example, car companies relocating plants from higher to lower
cost locations within the Union and just‐in‐time supply chains being created among
Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
However, empirical work on the impact of EU membership and the role of the single
market on FDI has lagged behind the theoretical discussion, largely because of problems
in the availability of suitable worldwide bilateral datasets. Thus, existing research on FDI
and European integration has previously covered only a few source or host economies
(Sanso‐Navarro, 2011), usually from among advanced economies (Aristotelous and
Fountas, 1996), and they have often sought to model total FDI inflows to a country
(Dunning, 1997; Neary, 2002), rather than the determinants of inter‐country flows,
although it is the latter that allows one to identify the impact of various forms of economic
integration for group members and non‐members, including the membership of the EU,
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFTA) and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur).
In contrast, the general literature on the determinants of FDI has exploited the growing
availability of country‐to‐country (bilateral) FDI datasets to move beyond explaining
single country inflows from the rest of the world. This work has been based on the use
of gravity models, already employed in the analysis of trade patterns (Baier and
Bergstrand, 2007), especially structural gravity models (Blonigen and Piger, 2014; Santos
Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) enabling researchers to test, for example, the effects of a range
of international agreements and arrangements on FDI inflows (Baier et al., 2014; Head
and Mayer, 2014). Even so, the first gravity‐based FDI studies used relatively simple
estimation methods and covered only developed economies with quite short datasets,
often only around ten to 15 years (Petroulas, 2007; Taylor, 2008) so their findings, while
stimulating, were not necessarily robust.
However, bilateral data on FDI inflows have recently been made available from The
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for almost every
economy in the world, while previously such bilateral data as were available were
restricted to Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) econo-
mies (Schiavo, 2007). This enables a study of the effects of EU membership on FDI, not
only for countries in the EU itself (De Sousa and Lochard, 2011), or between EU mem-
bers and other advanced economies (Bevan and Estrin, 2004) but also for the first time
including FDI from emerging economies. This is critical because in recent years FDI from
emerging economies has represented up to a third of total outflows and China has often
been the largest single FDI source economy (UNCTAD, 2019).
In this article we therefore exploit new long and global bilateral datasets, using
frontier estimation methods, to provide the first robust measures of the effects of EU
membership and the single market on FDI, and to compare them with the impact of
other models of economic integration, including the NAFTA and Mercosur agree-
ments. Our approach therefore follows Lawrence (1996) in distinguishing between
shallow and deep integration, with the former being largely economic while the latter
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involves a significant degree of political integration as well. Thus, the EU represents
the most significant, long‐lasting and continuously evolving example of deep integra-
tion (König and Ohr, 2013), while NAFTA or Mercosur are examples of shallow
economic integration.1 World Trade Organization (WTO) membership currently repre-
sents the lowest degree of integration for most advanced market and emerging econo-
mies. Our empirical analysis applies structural gravity models that have been used
extensively in the international trade literature where bilateral data have been available
for longer time (Anderson, 2011).
Our work is perhaps the first to use a huge new FDI data resource; the comprehensive
UNCTAD bilateral FDI dataset.2 This allows us to consider a much wider range of coun-
tries, (142, including all the principal emerging economies), and a much longer period
(1985–2018), than previous studies. Thus, we can estimate the effects of integration over
a much longer time than used in previous studies, and also compare the effects of EU
membership with other trading arrangements. It also facilitates the use of the most
advanced econometric methods.
There are three main novel findings. We find the impact of EU membership on FDI on
the host economy is always positive, significant and quite large, in the order of 60 per cent
for inward investment from outside the EU, and around 50 per cent for intra‐EU FDI. A
second important finding is that the effect of the EU membership on FDI is significantly
larger than membership of free trade area agreements, such as NAFTA, EFTA and
Mercosur, supporting the view of the benefits of deep economic integration compared
with shallow integration in capital inflows as well as trade. A third novel and important
finding is that we are able to separate econometrically the effects of the EU membership
before and after the implementation of the single market in 1993. Furthermore, when in-
cluding multilateral trade resistance terms (MTRs) in the empirical model specification,
we exploit more demanding methods than our baseline models, and show that the single
market is the cornerstone of the differential impact of deep compared with shallow inte-
gration. Accordingly, before the implementation of the single market, we find that EU
membership does not generate a significant impact on FDI. Instead, the positive signifi-
cant impact of the EU membership on FDI takes place only after the single market is
implemented.
The article is organised as follows. The next section 2 summarises the previous litera-
ture and sets up the framework we use for our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the
dataset providing extensive details because it has not been used before. Section 4
discusses our econometric estimates. The conclusion discusses the implications for policy
and future research.
I. FDI and Integration
We first outline the framework used to identify and measure the effects of EU member-
ship on FDI. As noted, the distinction between shallow and deep integration is important
for our analysis: shallow integration is restricted to economic integration and epitomised
1Campos et al. (2019) argue that deepening the EU reached institutional integration when member countries delegate to su-
pernational institutions (at least partially) political control over selected policies that go beyond those traditionally affected
by trade agreements and related competition policies.
2See for details http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_ChosenLang=en.
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by the free trade area model, while deep integration combines economic and political as-
pects, for example, a customs union in which economic ties are supported by the creation
of common institutions to manage conflicts. This is exemplified by the EU, especially the
single market (Campos et al., 2019). However, many major economies like China or
Japan, while deeply involved in the global economy, have undertaken neither deep nor
shallow economic integration with partners, though they may have signed some free trade
agreements, especially in recent years.
The literature on the effects of EU policies and programmes on FDI is surprisingly
thin. Thus, FDI has not received the same attention as the issues of trade and migration,
perhaps because the EU did not have an explicit policy on cross‐border investment until
very recently. However, the freedom of cross‐border movement of capital is one of the
four pillars of the single market. By reducing restrictions on capital flows across EU
member states, the single market deepens EU integration by increasing competition and
specialization (Badinger, 2007) and by improving the allocation of resources and gener-
ating economies of scale and scope (Baldwin, 1989). Associated with this, the diffusion
of best managerial practises and new products is also expected to foster innovation and
ultimately to increase productivity.
Our empirical analysis is based on the gravity model (Anderson, 2011; Anderson and
van Wincoop, 2003; Blonigen, 2005). Clear micro‐foundations for the use of the gravity
equation in the analysis of trade flows were provided by Anderson (1979), who derived
a trade gravity equation using the properties of Cobb–Douglas expenditure function.
More generally, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the emergence of a new trade theory
led to a variety of theoretical foundations for a trade gravity equation (Baldwin and
Taglioni, 2007). The gravity model has also been successfully applied to most other
forms of bilateral cross‐border flows, including migration and FDI (Baldwin and
Taglioni, 2011; Head and Mayer, 2014), though as an empirical rather than a theoretical
relationship.3 The fundamental idea is that the forces driving the main economic
relations between countries are similar to those identified by Newton in his law of
gravity, namely mass and distance. In the case of FDI, the gravity model proposes that
an empirical relationship drives the flows of FDI between two economies in terms of the
size (GDP) of the source (home) economy, the size of the recipient (host) economy and
the distance between them. The effect of home and host GDP was expected to be
approximately linear and positive while distance was expected to have a non‐linear
and negative effect. Distance was usually taken to reflect a range of transactional and
frictional costs and is often measured geographically or by factors such as legal, institu-
tional or cultural differences (Ghemawat, 2001). In the applications of gravity models to
trade, Baier et al. (2008) calculate that membership of the EU leads to increases in
bilateral international trade of the order of between 127 and 146 per cent after 10 to
fifteen years. This compares favourably with equivalently estimated benefits from
shallow integration; EFTA membership generates increases in bilateral trade of only
about one quarter of the size.
3Thus, the gravity model started out as a purely empirical model framework but has been given solid theoretical foundations
for trade flows. However, because the theory relies on market‐clearing conditions for an expenditure equation (Baldwin and
Taglioni, 2007) one cannot extend the model from trade, which is an output, to FDI, which is an input factor.
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The basic gravity equation model for estimating the impact of EU membership on FDI
is therefore the following Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) specification:
FDIo; d; t ¼ exp α0 þ α1EUo; t þ α2EUd; t þ α3lnX o; t þ α4lnX d; t þ It þ ηo; d
 þ uo; d; t (1)
where FDIo,d,t stands for unidirectional – sender to target – FDI flow and the lnXo,t is a
vector of the natural logarithm of characteristics of the origin (sender, partner) country,
o, in year t. Similarly, lnXd,t is a vector of the natural logarithm of characteristics of the
destination d (target, reporter) economy, in year t. The characteristics vector includes
the size of the economy (GDP) as well as indicators of time‐varying economic distance
(such as GDP per capita). Finally, EUo,t and EUd,t are the two main variables of interest,
constructed in the standard way as dummy variables.4
There has been considerable methodological progress in the application of gravity
models in recent years (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Bergstrand and Egger, 2007).
In particular, empirical applications have moved from the basic gravity model to the
new structural gravity approach (Blonigen and Piger, 2014; Fally, 2015). This is based
on the idea that moving from a cross‐section design to one based on panel data allows re-
searchers to address endogeneity bias (see also Baier and Bergstrand, 2004; Baier
et al., 2008, 2014; Baier and Bergstrand, 2009; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004;
UNCTAD, 2016). However, many of the key host and home economy variables in a grav-
ity equation, including almost all potential indicators of distance (such as transportation
costs, cultural affinity and geography), common borders, landlocked countries, ocean har-
bours, lack of mountains, tariffs, customs, different language/money, regulation and legal
origin, are either invariant or do not change greatly over time for each pair (dyad) of coun-
tries. For these reasons, structural gravity models (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) instead
include a dyadic fixed effect (?o,d)5 specifically, a dummy variable for each pair of coun-
tries. Thus, in this formulation, distance measures – which are invariant across country
pairs – are replaced by dyadic fixed effects and some country’s characteristics are re-
placed by multilateral trade resistance terms (MTRs). The inclusion of bilateral fixed ef-
fects helps to minimize the effects of the exclusion of many of the usual suspects in
explaining FDI flows. They control for country pair unobserved heterogeneity and im-
plicitly for factors such as cultural distance and bilateral regulatory agreements. The con-
cern over omitted variable bias is also mitigated in this way in these types of models. In
our work, we also include a full set of time dummies to control for global macroeconomic
shocks via year fixed effects It, which reflect the macro phenomena that are common
across all country pairs. The uo,d,t is the idiosyncratic error term.
It is important to note that the coefficients of interest, α1 and α2 on the EU membership
dummies, are identified via the impact of changes in economic and political relationships
(and other economic variables) over time on the change in FDI flows over time. Hence the
crucial importance of the length of the period used in the estimation of the model; in our
case, the period is 1985–2018. Being a member of the EU will be one of the time‐varying
observable characteristics of a country that enter the EUo,t and EUd,t vectors of
4For a detailed description see Table A1.
5Also called symmetric or un‐ordered.
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characteristics specific to a country and will include things like time‐varying pair proxy
for trade/investment costs and time‐varying pair proxy for regulatory cultural distance.
To estimate equation (1) we utilize a Poisson pseudo‐maximum likelihood (PPLM)
estimation and control for dyadic fixed effects and time dummies (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro, 2006). The PPMLmethod represents the current stage in the evolution of model-
ling gravity equations, because there is no FDI at all between many bilateral country pairs
(about 70 per cent of the pairs in our data), while FDI is very large between a few such pairs
(say the UK and USA or Germany and China). The PPML estimator is designed to address
the resulting highly right‐skewed nature of the distribution of FDI. Standard errors are also
clustered by dyadic country pair to allow for serial correlation of the errors.
II. Data Set
FDI reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one econ-
omy (‘direct investor’) in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor
(‘direct investment enterprise’). The lasting interest implies the existence of a long‐term
relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of
influence or control over the management of the enterprise. In general, direct investment
involves both the initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent capital
and income transactions between them.
As far as measurement accounting is concerned, FDI flows record the value of
cross‐border transactions related to direct investment during a given period. Financial
flows consist of equity transactions, the reinvestment of earnings and intercompany debt
transactions, instead. Outward flows represent transactions that increase the investment
that investors in the funder economy have in enterprises in a foreign economy, such as
through purchases of equity or the reinvestment of earnings, less any transactions that de-
crease the investment that investors in the funder economy have in enterprises in a foreign
economy, such as sales of equity or borrowing by the resident investor from the foreign
enterprise. Inward flows represent transactions that increase the investment that foreign
investors have in enterprises resident in the reporting economy less transactions that
decrease the investment of foreign investors in resident enterprises. In our data we look
directly at bilateral FDI flows (inflows for one country and outflow for the other) in
millions of current USD.
We use the UNCTAD’s bilateral FDI statistics as our primary data source. It provides
data for economies reporting FDI inflows, outflows, inward stocks and outward stocks in
all major countries in the world.6 In this article, we focus on FDI inward flows.7 For the
purpose of international comparison, we use millions of USD as currency units. The
FDI data have been merged with International Monetary Fund data8 on the
6The data are highly correlated with the OECD bilateral FDI statistics on the overlapping countries’ sample, that is, 1990
onwards. Therefore, the 1985–1989 sample has been used based on the OECD bilateral FDI source. In fact, at the end
of the 1980s the number of non‐OECD countries engaging in FDI was negligible, though it has increased greatly since.
7We use the whole number of 142 countries reporting FDI inflows from all around the world. The number of partners –
countries sending FDI – may be higher than 142, however. These are small countries that do not receive any FDI at all.
Some FDI flows are negative in sign. These instances of disinvestment arise because either equity capital, reinvested earn-
ings or intra‐company loans are negative and are not offset by the remaining components. Negative flows have a real eco-
nomic meaning and, because of their numerical importance, we cannot eliminate them without losing consistency, so we
treat them as zero.
8International Monetary Fund DataMapper: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/WEO/1
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macroeconomic indicators of these countries including GDP and GDP per capita, both in
USD purchasing power parity (PPP).
In order to build a measure of deeper economic integration, we draw from the EU
website9 and combine the information on membership of the EU and the timing of the
start of the single market, both pieces of information being country and time specific.
For example, the variable EU membership after the start of the single market is a binary
time‐variant variable equal to 1 only if the country is in the EU in a specific year and the
single market has already started (after 1993). This contrasts with the variable EU prior
the start of the single market, that takes the value of unity only for EU members and only
up to 1992. The detailed list of variables used in this article is provided in Table A1 and
summary statistics in A2 and A3. In our dataset each observation contains information of
FDI flows from the source‐partner to the target‐reporter country, the EU membership sta-
tus of both target and source countries, the macroeconomic conditions of both target and
source countries, and other relevant information, such as if they are members of other
plurilateral agreements (NAFTA, EFTA and Mercosur).
As far as the time span is concerned, we used all available years covered by the
UNCTAD database, from 1990 to 2018, combined where relevant with the OECD
dataset, which is available only for OECD countries for the period, 1985–89. The maxi-
mum possible number of observations is 174,002. Of course, 1985 is a critical year in
terms of the EU economic integration project because the Single Market Act was signed
and became the institutional landmark that steered and deepened economic integration in
the EU. We constructed our data as an unbalanced panel with zeros assigned due to miss-
ing values (no flows). For many country‐year pairs, especially before the 1980s, bilateral
FDI flows were in fact zero.
Our initial research question concerns the effect of the EU membership on
target‐reporting country FDI inflows, which we test via the sign and significance of a co-
efficient concerning whether in each year the target economy is or is not a member of the
EU (EU member, target). The EU membership step‐dummy captures whether the recipi-
ent of bilateral FDI flows is a member of the EU and therefore measures the overall cu-
mulated premium through the time of the membership of increased (or decreased, if
negative) FDI from any potential sender. In other words, the EU target dummy measures
the premium of increased FDI towards EU members from any other country in the sample
(EU and not EU). We also include a step‐dummy for whether the sender‐partner country
in each year is a member of the EU.
Empirical Analysis
The Baseline Model: PPML Estimates
Table 1 shows estimates of our baseline model with the dependent variable being bilateral
FDI flows.10 Note that because this is a structural gravity model, all the potential factors
9See https://europa.eu/european‐union/about‐eu/countries/member‐countries_en; https://europa.eu/european‐union/topics/
single‐market_en.
10In the literature, FDI stock as well as flow data have been used in the estimation of gravity models because stocks tend to
be more stable over time than flows. In this article, we report only results using flow data, which are more suitable for grav-
ity estimation models. In previous work (available from the authors on request) we have estimated the same equations using
stock data, with similar results.
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often discussed to explain FDI, for example distance, common borders and colonial rela-
tionships, are included in the dyadic fixed effects.
The main variable of interest is the one capturing deep economic integration via EU
membership, namely the estimated coefficients for the EU member target. The value is
60 per cent (e0.47–1) and it is highly statistically significant. The gravity variables are also
significant with expected signs. The economic size of the two countries is measured by
GDP and the level of development is measured by GDP per capita. As we would expect
from a gravity framework, the economic size of both sender and target significantly and
positively affect FDI. The level of development is another indicator of distance
(Ghemawat, 2001) and is therefore also often included in gravity models, especially when
considering flows from countries with different levels of economic development. In line
with the literature, we confirm a positive, significant and sizable effect of the EU on FDI
inflows though on the basis of one of the largest and longer databases ever used on FDI.
Incidentally, we also show a positive and significant effect of outward FDI (coefficient on
partner) for the EU, suggesting an impact of the EU on intra‐EU FDI.
How does our estimate compare with and relate to other estimates in the literature?
Straathof et al. (2008) use a gravity model to examine bilateral FDI stocks. One of their
specifications uses dyadic fixed effects, a somewhat different set of controls and earlier
data (1981–2005). They find that EU membership yields a 28 per cent increase in its
inward FDI stocks from other EU countries and a 14 per cent increase from non‐EU coun-
tries (their Table 5.1, column 2). De Sousa and Lochard (2011) in related work use a short
Table 1: Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) Estimate of the Effect of the EU





















Notes: Clustered standard errors in brackets *** P< 0.01, ** P< 0.05, * P< 0.1. All regressions include fixed effects for
years and dyadic pair (symmetric). Reporter, country receiving the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows; partner, the
country sending the FDI. PPP, purchasing power parity; FE, fixed effects.
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panel (1992–2005) to investigate whether the creation of the euro explains the increase in
intra‐European investment flows. They find that it increased intra‐Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) FDI stocks by around 30 per cent. Petroulas (2007) finds that
EMU increased inward FDI flows within the euro area by approximately 16 per cent,
an estimate that is broadly confirmed by Sondermann and Vansteenkiste (2019). We
can also look at the bilateral trade flows literature for a comparison. Baier et al. (2008)
find that trade is increased by about 130 per cent after ten to 15 years of the EU member-
ship, while the similar impact of EFTA membership is about 35 per cent. We find instead
that EU membership increases FDI inflows by about 60 per cent and, as we show below,
that is mostly driven by the single market effect.
Deep Versus Shallow Integration
We extend our baseline estimation to additional specifications and estimation methods to
test in more detail the channels through which the EU might impact on FDI. Thus, we ac-
count for other economic integration agreements, elicit the role of multilateral resistance
terms (MRTs) and empirically test the role of the single market, established on 1 January
1993. We report and discuss these results in the subsections below.
Membership of Other Integration Agreements
We first consider the effect of membership of other forms of economic integration,
namely, NAFTA, EFTA and Mercosur, that are free trade areas (FTAs) and potentially
alternatives to the WTO membership. The reason is twofold: on the one hand we concep-
tually compare EU membership with other integration agreements, on the other hand we
test whether the use of different agreements scenarios may alter the estimated size effect
of the EU membership. Our specification is as follows:
FDIo; d; t ¼ exp½α0 þ α1d EUd; t þ α1o EUo; t þ α2d NAFTAd; t þ α2o NAFTAo; t þ α3d
EFTAd; t þ α3o EFTAo; t þ α4d Mercosurd; t þ α4o Mercosuro; t þ It þ ηo; dþuo; d; t
(2)
Because NAFTA,11 EFTA12 and Mercosur13 are important FTAs we do control for the
membership of those FTAs14 in addition to that of the EU. In equation (1), our counterfac-
tual to EU membership is other plurilateral trade agreements, and FTAs and conformity
with WTO rules. The calculated premium of the EU membership in equation (1)
compares against any country outside the EU, but within other economic integration
agreements (such as FTAs) or WTO terms. In other words, from the results in Table 1
we would not be able to identify which of the two effects – FTAs versus WTO terms –
prevails. This is potentially problematic. In fact, the ‘EU estimated premium’ may be
11The NAFTA members are Canada, Mexico and the USA.
12The EFTA members are Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland (with partial participation in the single market).
13Mercosur members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Venezuela is a full member but has been suspended
since 1 December 2016.
14We exploit the most up‐to‐date version of the Database on Economic Integration Agreements (April 2017) from the
https://sites.nd.edu/jeffrey-bergstrand/database-on-economic-integration-agreements/ website and recent updates from
NAFTA, EFTA and Mercosur official websites.
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different when compared with alternative baselines: Lichtenstein and Norway (both
EFTA members) or USA and Canada (both NAFTA members), or Brazil (as a member
of Mercosur) or countries not in any integrated association but within bilateral FTAs as
members of the WTO.
In the estimates reported in Table 2 columns 2 to 4, we add in sequence NAFTA, EFTA
and Mercosur dummies, as well as repeating column 1 from Table 1 for a comparison. We
find that the premium of the EU membership is now estimated to be even bigger than in
the baseline scenario, the reason being that the counterfactual against which we esti-
mate the premium is composed of countries not belonging to EU, NAFTA, EFTA or
Mercosur.
The results reported in Table 2 confirm that the effect of the EU membership on FDI
into targeted economies remains large, between 60 per cent (e0.47 – 1) and 86 per cent
(e0.62 – 1). On the other hand, the coefficient on other FTAs reporter are significantly
lower (or even negative) than the one on EU reporter membership dummy: the EU
premium with respect to NAFTA is in the order of 230 per cent (e[0.62‐(0.59)] – 1); the
EU premium with respect to EFTA has a lower bound15 in the order of 34 per cent
(e[0.62‐(0.32)] – 1) and finally, the EU premium with respect to Mercosur has a lower bound
in the order of 100 per cent (e[0.62‐(0.08)] – 1).
We interpret this set of results to imply that EU membership (deep integration) remains
more effective than the other main plurilateral trade agreements (shallow integration) in
delivering higher FDI from any other part of the world. The implications of these results
are profound. We have tested the relationship between membership to EU and FDI over a
very long time span and a comprehensively global FDI database against other forms of
economic integration. The results are stark and clear. The EU remains the bloc delivering
the highest premium as far FDI inflows are concerned.
Time‐varying Multilateral Resistance Termss
Following UNCTAD (2013, 2016), we estimate a model with MTRs including time‐vary-
ing sender‐time and receiver‐time fixed effects. MTRs absorb the size variables (lnXo,t and
lnXd,t) from the structural gravity model, as well as all other observable and unobservable
country‐specific characteristics, which vary across these dimensions. These include vari-
ous national policies, institutions, EU‐reporter and EU‐partner, exchange rates regimes,
and so on. For this reason, we can only use a set of dummies for EU, NAFTA, EFTA
and Mercosur that identify a mutual (origin and destination alike: EUo,d,t NAFTAo,d,t
EFTAo,d,t Mercosuro,d,t) membership participation, instead.16 We use the following
specification:
FDIo; d; t ¼ exp½α0 þ α1 EUo; d; t þ α2 NAFTAo; d; t þ α3 EFTAo; d; t þ α4 Mercosuro; d; t
þ Iot þ Idt þ It þ ηo; dþuo; d; t
(3)
In Table 3, we include both MTRs (UNCTAD, 2016) and the others three FTAs (Baier
and Bergstrand, 2007). In these estimates, the impact of the EU membership remains
15The EFTA and Mercosur reporter coefficients are not significantly different from the WTO omitted category, which is
why the EU premium is at least 34 per cent and 100 per cent, respectively.
16These dummies are not collinear with dyadic dummies, being time‐variant.
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strongly significant, 50 per cent (e0.41 – 1) and (statistically) larger than any alterative
shallower form of FTA. However, the interpretation is now slightly different from that
of Table 1 and 2: the intra‐EU FDI flow is 50 per cent higher than the inflows between
countries of other economic integration areas. In particular, we elicit from column 4 that
the effect is remarkably higher than any other NAFTA EFTA or Mercosur integration
areas, the latter actually registering a reduced intra‐FTA inflow vis‐à‐vis other countries.
Summing up, we estimate that the EFTA inflow premium is 37 per cent17 (Table 2) and
the intra‐EFTA premium to be 6 per cent (Table 3), although neither is statistically sig-
nificant. Our estimates also show that the NAFTA inflow premium is 45 per cent (Table
2) while the intra‐NAFTA premium is 6 per cent (Table 3), although only the former is
statistically significant. Finally, we estimate the Mercosur inflow premium is 9 per cent
(Table 2) while that of the intra‐Mercosur premium is 67 per cent (Table 3), although
only the latter is statistically significant.
The single market Effect
Finally, we consider the effects of the EU membership as well as EFTA decomposed into
prior start of the single market (up to 1992) and post‐single market (1993 onwards). The
specification of the estimating equation in Table 4 is identical to Table 2, and similarly Ta-
ble 5 is identical to Table 3, except that we have ‘decomposed the effect of the EU and
Table 3: Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimate of the effects of the EU
membership on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows: Multilateral Resistance Terms and
Alternative Free Trade Areas





















Observations 134,035 134,035 134,035 134,035
Pseudo R2 0.7780 0.7780 0.7780 0.7780
Partner‐year FE (MTRs) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reporter‐year FE (MTRs) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered standard errors in brackets, *** P< 0.01, ** P< 0.05, * P< 0.1. All regressions include fixed effects for
years, dyadic pair (symmetric) and country‐time dummies (MTRs that stands for multilateral resistance terms). Reporter, the
country receiving the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows; partner, the country sending the FDI. Regressions run on the
very same sample of other tables: 39967 observation are dropped because they belong to groups with all zeros (39,967 +
134,035 = 174,002). FE, fixed effects.
17The EFTA premium is relative lower than the EU premium, notwithstanding the participation of EFTA countries into the
EEA and therefore in the single market, starting from 1994 – Norway and Iceland – and 1995 – Liechtenstein. Therefore,
the whole period 1985–1994 could be considered a delayed loss of part of the premium enjoyed by countries which were
already in the EU. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this point.
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EFTA’ into two periods, pre and post the establishment of the single market in January
1993. We find that pre‐1993, EU and EFTA members did not experience any premium in
terms of their FDI inflows. However, the establishment of the single market increased it
enormously. If we look at the result of the most comprehensive regression in column 4,
the EU premium is in the order of 93 per cent (e0.66 – 1) for the EU and of 70 per cent
(e0.53 – 1) for EFTA. Incidentally, as far as outward FDI is concerned, both the EU and
EFTA experienced high values even before 1993.
Finally, we test our main research question with the most stringent set of controls
(MTRs, dyadic dummies and year dummies) in Table 5. Our previous results continue
to hold under the exacting specification: the premium to intra‐EU FDI flows is driven
by the single market for EU countries. It is clear that neither EFTA nor NAFTA show ben-
efits remotely close to those of EU combined with single market membership, whereas
Mercosur membership actually suffered with respect to other agreements (as indicated
by its negative coefficient).
Conclusions
How much additional FDI does a country receive because it chooses to engage in deep
vis‐à‐vis shallower forms of economic integration? This is an important question in the
European policy debate for which, surprisingly, one still finds very few answers. In
this article, we calculate that EU membership increases FDI inflows by between
60 and 85 per cent (inward FDI from outside) and around 50 per cent for intra‐EU.
Furthermore, we show the role played by the single market to be key in that augmen-
tation of FDI.
Because these new estimates are considerably larger than previous findings, we under-
took a series of stringent tests. Firstly, we compared other levels or depths of economic
integration, for example membership of EFTA, NAFTA and Mercosur as the alternative
to the baseline membership to the WTO. The positive impact of EU membership on
FDI is found to be much greater than that of shallower economic integration areas.
Secondly, we use a fully fledged multilateral resistance terms (MTRs) estimation and find
that the premium of intra‐EU FDI is in the order of 50 per cent, again higher than any
other integration initiative around the globe. Finally, we also test for the role of the single
market, which we find to be the key driver of FDI inflows as well as of intra‐EU FDI,
though not for EFTA members.
The article yields various implications for future research and for policy. Regarding the
implications from our results for future research, we highlight four main issues we think
should be carefully investigated in the future. Firstly, there is the issue of the sectoral
composition of FDI, because one suspects that the effects may be quite heterogeneous
across sectors, for instance, when one considers a comparison between services and
manufacturing. Although data availability remains a substantial constraint to such exer-
cises, we believe they are and will remain of utmost importance. It is reasonable to expect
that the implementation of the single market has affected capital and labour‐intensive
sectors differently and, indeed, that the introduction of the single currency has affected
financial and non‐financial sectors in dissimilar ways.
A second promising issue for future research is the possibility of a complementarity
between FDI and other forms of integration (international trade and equity flows) which
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is particularly relevant in light of the increasing importance of global value chains. A third
promising area of future research is to dwell deeper on various institutional aspects that
have received mixed attention so far in the literature, more specifically, issues such as
corruption, the rule of law, inequality and the quality of state institutions, on the one hand,
and corporate tax rates and tax havens on the other.
Finally, the issue of expectations should receive a more detailed treatment. We recog-
nise that a dummy for EU accession does not fully capture effects that occur prior to EU
membership (that is, from progress in accession negotiations and/or changes to candidate
status). Once a country becomes an official candidate, investors may have already formu-
lated their expectations prior to the official membership, which may influence their
investment decisions (Bevan and Estrin, 2004). Future work should try to tease out these
potential differences. At the same time, our findings indicate that EU membership has a
pronounced impact on FDI, in addition to the effects already identified in the literature
for trade. Moreover, we do not find any evidence that these benefits can be obtained by
operating under, say, WTO rules on a global basis, or by joining alternative trading areas.
Our database is the first that allows for an analysis of the impact on FDI of these alterna-
tives to the WTO.
Regarding the implications of our findings for policy, the first candid observation we
must make is that we believe that FDI until very recently was one of the very few areas
on which the EU was broadly silent. However, this has (in our view, correctly) changed
recently. Former Commission President Juncker presented a proposal to create a first
EU‐wide framework for FDI during his 2017 State of the Union address. Although it
was restricted to screening foreign investment into the EU, in March 2019 the proposal
was adopted by the European Parliament and by the Council and has now entered into
force (European Commission, 2019). Europe is still recovering from a global financial
crisis in which investment has played a central role. Many well‐designed policy proposals
are on the table but have not received the priority (by which we mean the financial
resources and political support and focus) they require. The new framework is a step in
the right direction, but it does not suffice. In principle, FDI can play a key role in accel-
erating and deepening the recovery because of the robustness of its long‐term productivity
effects, which can, if properly promoted, be further supported by EU integration, and vice
versa. However, this may be harder to achieve in a post‐COVID world where we are
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